Abstract-As an emerging fast-growing technology, smart grid networks (SGNs) have been dramatically accepted by the current power supply industry for achieving high performance power governance system. The wireless SGN (WSGNs) have enabled numerous flexible power management solutions without the restrictions of the wired infrastructure. The cognitive radio network (CRN) is one of the widely deployed wireless networking approaches. The communication security is a major concern while CRN is used in WSGNs. Currently, jamming and spoofing are two common attack approaches that are active in the deployment of WSGNs when using CRNs. This paper proposes an attack strategy, maximum attacking strategy using spoofing and jamming (MASS-SJ), which utilizes an optimal power distribution to maximize the adversarial effects. Spoofing and jamming attacks are launched in a dynamic manner in order to interfere with the maximum number of signal channels. Our proposed approach has been evaluated by our experiments and the results have shown the positive performance of using MAS-SJ.
wireless solution that can provide a higher level security for communications [2] , [3] . The CRN system is programmable by which the networking system can avoid some jamming or spoofing attacks. This advantage is mainly based on the predictions of the potential threats, such that the communication can be protected by using Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA). Therefore, traditional attack strategies can hardly block the wireless communications. This paper proposes a novel attack approach that uses both jamming and spoofing to intervene normal wireless communications of CRN in WSGN. Our attack approach is named as Maximum Attacking Strategy using Spoofing and Jamming (MAS-SJ) that emphasizes the level of attack effects. The proposed adversarial strategy is based on the fact that the required power of jamming or spoofing attacks are varied in different frequencies. Using our proposed approach can maximize the attack frequency scope by generating an optimal power distribution solution. Fig. 1 illustrates the structure of MAS-SJ as well as the positions of attack points.
As shown Fig. 1 , WCRN is the medium that connects power sources and power users. A crucial part of the attack operations occurs at the spectrum sensing stage. This process provides adversaries with chances to intrude the system by jamming or spoofing attacks. The grey-colored circles in the figure represent the attack points when the communications connecting datacenter with IP-based infrastructure, including both power users and power plants. Prior researches have addressed this issue and a few adversary approaches were proposed [4] , [5] . However, the power limitation has been restricting the adversarial performances.
In our research, we consider the optimal power distributions the crucial problem in the CRN attack issue. The proposed approach aims to maximize the attack effect using spectrum adversarial occupations. The spoofing and jamming attacks are dynamically switched in order to reach the highest level of the power usage. In addition, there are two main users in CRN, which are Primary Users (PUs) and Secondary Users (SUs) [6] . Our approach mainly focuses on attacking at SUs and reduce SUs' spectrum availability and transmission performance. The main algorithm supporting our mechanism uses dynamic programming, since the communication states can be considered relative stable for a certain operation period. The outcome is an optimal solution that maximizes the attack efficiency.
The main contributions of this paper include two aspects.
• We propose a novel approach of increasing the adversarial effect by dynamically implementing spoofing and jamming attacks to CRN in WSGN. The attack manners consider both attack return values and success probabilities under the constraint of the available power.
• Our approach uses dynamic programming to solve the power distribution optimal problem. The remainder of this paper is organized by the following order: We have synthesized recent related work and presented main findings in Section II. Moreover, we give a motivational example to briefly explain the proposed mechanism in Section III. Next, the problem is defined in Section IV, which also provides the description of the proposed model. Furthermore, Section V illustrates the main algorithms used in the proposed approach and Section VI shows partial experimental results. Finally, Section VII presents the conclusions of the research.
II. RELATED WORK
In WSGN, control signals deliveries rely on the wireless connections when IP-based infrastructure is deployed. Thus, the wireless connection is one of the major targets for adversaries to launch the malicious attacks. In common, a successful attack may include both jamming and spoofing. The tradeoff between jamming and spoofing had been explored by earlier researches [4] , which indicated that these two adversarial methods required different powers in terms of frequency spectrums. Jamming attacks usually stops the continuous data transmissions or intervene in multiple channels between signal senders and receivers. Spoofing attacks carry fraudulent data to data users such that the grid control can be broken down due to the wrong information over the WSGN system [7] , [8] . For example, grid operators have to use the older data for the system analysis and estimations when jamming or spoofing attacks take place.
The attack launched over WSGN will fool the grid monitoring system that collects data from Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs). A PMU is an infrastructure that measures the electrical waves for the purpose of real-time data synchronization in grid systems [9] . Collecting real-time data from PMUs is a fundamental requirement for estimating the immediate WSGN conditions, as well as an essential for system adjustments and operations [10] . Defending jamming and spoofing is difficult due to the wide distribution of signal senders or grid points and the broad geographical coverage [11] . Therefore, interrupting communications of WSGN is an alternative adversarial approach to reduce or ruin the performance of smart grids.
Meanwhile, prior researches have addressed both jamming and spoofing attacks in various wireless networks, such as vehicular networks [12] , [13] and cognitive radio networks [2] , [14] . We have reviewed both malicious techniques developed by recent researches. Jamming attacks are considered a channel-related threat in contemporary networking deployment. Pei et al. [15] investigated an adversarial method using multi-antenna wiretap channels and a passive eavesdropper with an external helper. This work was based on the assumption of the fixed total bandwidth for two feedback channels, such that the signal receiver needs to distribute the available feedback bits to the transmitter and helper. Distinguish from this research direction, our research focused on using two types of attack methods under the power constraint. Multiple frequency spectrums could be involved in our research problem. Thus, dynamically changing the attack targets on frequency spectrums could result in a high difficulty of threat detections, as well as forming solutions.
Moreover, some recent researches explored similar work in jamming attacks and defenses, such as applying the game theory [16] , [17] . Ma et al. [18] proposed a jamming attack approach that uses multiact dynamic game theory by designing a game balancing the profits between attackers and defenders over the reduced signal channels. This research focused on the wireless remote control in smart grid, which had similar research target to our work. A relevant work was also done by Li et al. [19] , which focused on the remote state estimations using game theory. Our approach had a different standpoint of the adversarial behavior, which considered power limitations rather than the state analyses in attacks.
In addition, as a common malicious method, spoofing attacks [20] also target at PMU in smart grids. Recent researches had similar investigations addressing attacks at various layers of the smart grids. Fan et al. [21] developed a defense mechanism against simultaneous spoofing attacks cross different PMU layers. This approach used a trustworthiness evaluation that considered both physical layer information and power grid measurements. Wang et al. [22] further explored the transport layer protocol that provided capability of analyzing possible security vulnerabilities by measuring communications between PMUs and phasor data concentrators. Notwithstanding the prior researches above, our work had a different focus addressing an attack strategy. Our proposed approach aimed to maximize the jamming and spoofing performance when the power capability is fixed, which could dynamically change the adversarial manner based on estimations. The WSGN would be interfered even though the system might be able to detect an ongoing attack.
Next, some researches addressed the privacy-preserving approach to prevent privacy leakages [23] , [24] . For example, Shi et al. [25] proposed a grouping-based protocol that was designed to protect users' privacy within a distributed smart meter deployment. This approach relied on the private stream aggregation protocol. Liu et al. [26] proposed to use a random walk-based data collection scheme that can avoid eavesdropping in wireless communications. Another research pointed out that securing Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) in smart grid could be achieved by role-dependent privacy preservations [27] . The user roles in the grid could be defined by the energy states. Despite prior researches explored the solution to privacy protections in SGN, the threats caused by jamming and spoofing still could not be solved. Fraudulent data still brought risks to the system operations and this problem was addressed by our work. In summary, our work was different from prior work and had innovations in increasing attack performances. In our work, we emphasized the diverse power requirements when jamming and spoofing attacks were launched. Different from prior other work, our research considered successful attack likelihoods and power estimations for jamming and spoofing, and aim to obtain the highest attack effect by using our proposed optimal solution.
III. MOTIVATIONAL EXAMPLE
Assume there are five attack target spectrums in the CRN of WSGN. The adversarial motivation is to acquire a higher level attack return value considering success attack likelihoods when the power supply is limited. Our objective is to gain the maximum adversarial performance within a certain power constraint. Two attack manners include jamming and spoofing. Table I provisions the parameters used in the given example.
In Table I , F i refers to the spectrums in CRN. Pw shows the required power levels. Pr gives the successful attack probabilities for each assault. Moreover, we introduced Value-Weights (Vw) to assess the return rates of the attack. Vw can be configured by the preferences of the adversaries, such as bandwidth, spectrum usage rate, and spectrum active time.
In addition, Table II shows a basic table mapping Table IV that is called a D- Table. There are two crucial components in the process of the D- Table generation,   TABLE II  BASIC TABLE (B-TABLE) which include using power constraints to create constraint line and using frequency spectrums to produce iterations. Details of D- Table generation is given in Section V. Table IV provisions all optimal solutions to the power distribution problem with the values of probabilities and value-weights. According to D- Table, we can obtain a few optimal solutions under power constraints. There are 6 optional solutions when power constraint is 20, as we configured at the beginning of this section. The solutions include (0.1, 24), (0.08, 25), (0.072, 28), (0.06, 30), (0.054, 33), (0.038, 34). For example, the attack strategy for (0.1, 24) is jamming on F 4 and spoofing on F 1 , F 2 , F 3 , and F 5 . The attack strategy for (0.038, 34) is jamming on F 1 , F 2 , and F 5 and spoofing on F 3 and F 4 . The attack (0.1, 24) has a higher probability than (0.038, 24). But its attack return value is lower than the latter one. The alternative of attack strategy depends on the adversary's preference.
Next, there are 7 alternatives when the power constraint is 30. which include (0. Table III shows all optimal attack strategies under the configured power constraints. Adversaries can determine the attack strategy based on the assaulting priority, such as success rates 
IV. CONCEPTS AND THE PROPOSED MODEL

Definition 1 [Power Distribution Optimal Problem (PDOP)]:
Inputs include a list consisting of the following parameter information: the number of spectrum N, an individual frequency is represented as F i , a certain level power constraint Pw, value weight (Vw) for each attack manner using a certain level power Pw on F i , attack success probability using a certain level power Pw on F i , a jamming attack manner J, and a spoofing attack manner S. The output is an attack strategy plan. The proposed problem is to find out the optimal power distribution plan to maximize the attack effect.
As defined in Definition 1, we represent the main research problem solved by our approach. Inputs contain a group of variables representing the power costs, return values, and constraint configurations for jamming and spoofing attacks. We consider launching attacks over various frequency spectrums F i in a dynamic manner. Two categories of data are required. First, we need the constraint data, which the pre-configured power constraints Pw aligning with the certain likelihood and return value. Second, we need a set of parameter data, including value weight Vw of attacker method using a certain level power Pw and its attack success likelihood on an F i . Two attack methods in our strategy are jamming (J) and spoofing (S). In addition, the output will be an attack strategy plan, which determines the attack method on each frequency spectrum, from selecting jamming or spoofing.
Moreover, our attack strategy, MAS-SJ, is designed on the basis of the features of jamming and spoofing attacks. The attack effects can be counted in either probability or return values Fig. 2 illustrates the operating principles of jamming and spoofing attacks in CRN. Fig. 2 (a) shows the characteristics of CRN that various power levels are required for occupying different frequencies. The cubes in the figure represents the spectrums in use. The height of each cube illustrates the power level required by adversaries. The distinctness of the heights shows the variety of demanded powers. The adversarial positions are marked in the figure. In addition, Fig. 2 (b) represents a CRN frame structure that consists of a sensing and a transmission slots. In CRN, the vulnerabilities often address the periodic sensing stage in which the secondary users are searching available spectrums.
where
and
under a power constraint (Pw). Furthermore, our approach aims to find out an optimal adversarial plan when the level of available power Pw is fixed. To consider the total return value, we give the objective function of the problem in Eq. (1), which shows that the goal is to maximize the pair (Vw total , Pr total ) under the given power constraint Pw. Given a binary function s(i), s(i) = 1 when J attack is applied and s(i) = 0 when S attack is applied. The total attack return value Vw total is a sum of all return values from all frequency spectrums, expressed in Eq. (2). Additionally, the adversarial strategy will depend on the attack success probabilities. The method of calculating total Pr total is shown in Eq. (3) that is a production of all probabilities.
Using our proposed approach can dynamically switch attack methods between jamming and spoofing in order to reach the optimum attack performance. Main algorithms supporting our approach are given in the following Section V.
V. ALGORITHMS
In this section, we present two main algorithms in our proposed MSA-SJ model.
A. Maximum Attacking Strategy (MAS) Algorithm
Notations used in algorithms are given as follows: P k i,j denotes the probability of ith frequency spectrum with the power value j. k is the index number. V k i,j denotes the value weight of ith frequency spectrum with the power value j. Additionally, we define an operator " " for calculating probabilities and value weights, which is used for the purpose of pair alternatives. The definition is given in Definition 2.
Definition 2: ∃ two pairs (P i , V i ) and (
Algorithm 1, MAS, is designed to generate a D- Table. Input of this algorithm is a Basic Table (B-Table) that maps all the values of Pr and Vw for each spectrum within all power constraints. In the D-Table, all optimal solutions with parameters Pr and Vw are provided, which represents an attack strategy plan. An efficient attack strategy to WSGN can be obtained by selecting one solution matching the attack preferences. The attack plan generated from MAS algorithm is an optimal solution, which relies on Theorem 1. The proof of Theorem 1 is also given below.
Theorem 1: Any attack strategy plan in D-Table produced by MAS algorithm is an optimal solution to finding out the power distribution plan for maximizing jamming and spoofing effects.
To prove Theorem 1, we use contradiction proof method that is expressed as follows:
Proof: Configure the conditions as each step can create the local optimal solution, such that optimal solution generation is a process of recursion formulations. Assume that the local optimal solution at the power constraint PC for frequency for ∀ Power j do 4: for ∀ Power k in B i,k do 5: if D i−1,j−k != null then 6 :
end if 8: end for 9: Remove unnecessary pairs by applying Algorithm 2 10: end for 11: end for 12: Return D- Table ( contains the attack strategy plan)
Since both (P a , V b ) and (P k , V j ) are local optimal solutions, (P k+1 , V j+1 ) is an optimal solution at the power constraint PC. Thus, all conditions above are correct according to the assumption.
Additionally, assume that there exists an attack plan (P k ', V j ') performing a better effect than (P k , V j ) when adding a new frequency spectrum
proved above, we can deduce the following results based on two situations:
, which depicts that (P k+1 ', V j+1 ') has a better attack performance than (P k+1 , V j+1 ). However, this deduction contradicts with the given conditions. Therefore, Theorem 1 is correct.
We represent the main phases of this algorithm as follows: 1) B- Table (Basic Table) is the input of this algorithm. Each pair is corresponded with a power constraint, as well as a frequency spectrum. The first step is to look into the frequency spectrum list and use the first frequency spectrum as the first row entry data. 2) Consider all available power constraints for frequency spectrums, we calculate the pairs and add the values to D- Table. We use UPR algorithm to remove all unnecessary pairs to only keep all optimal solutions in the table. 3) Repeat the same process by adding new frequency spectrums and the corresponding optimal solutions until the entire D-Table is created. Each frequency spectrum is corresponding with a row in D Table. 4) We produce the final optimal solution using back forward method and output the result. Time Complexity Analysis: The time complexity of this algorithm is T(n) = O(n × Pw × Pair), from which n refers to the amount of the frequency spectrums, Pw refers to the
Algorithm 2 Unnecessary Pair Remover (UPR) Algorithm
Require: A list of (P k i,j , V k i,j ) Ensure: A new list L (unnecessary paris removed) 1: Sort the list by P i,j in an ascending order 2: for k=1 to list.length -1 do
else if then 7: Drop (P else if then 10: if
end if 13: end if 14: end for 15: Return L' power constraint, Pair refers to the average number of the pairs at each cell. To discern the time complexity of MAS Algorithm, we have our complexity analysis based on evaluating D-Table. First, we have n rows in D-Table, which is aligned with the amount of the frequency spectrums. Second, we need look into the number of the cell at each row, as well as the computation of each cell. For each row, the number of the cell is determined by the power constraint Pw. At each cell, the comparisons need to be completed by comparing all pairs in order to store all optimal solutions. Thus, we consider the average number of the pairs at each cell that is Pair. Therefore, the time complexity of Algorithm 1 is
B. Unnecessary Pair Remover (UPR) Algorithm
UPR algorithm is designed to remove the redundant pairs. As shown in Algorithm 2, inputs include a list of (P k i,j , V k i,j ), which contains all required parameters. Outputs include an updated list that only keeps optimal solutions by removing all unnecessary pairs. This algorithm is also a component of Algorithm 1 that will use the output of Algorithm 2. The correctness of obtaining optimal solutions has been proved by Theorem 1 proof.
The mechanism of this algorithm is to compare pairs stored at the same cell in D-Table. Both probability and return values will be assessed. For example, if P 1 =P 2 , V 1 > V 2 , the pair (P 2 , V 2 ) will be removed from the table. The next section shows the experimental evaluations and our main findings.
VI. EXPERIMENT AND THE RESULTS
A. Experimental Configuration
We evaluated our approach via a set of experimental evaluations. The experimental configuration was designed to examine two main aspects, including the comparisons of the successful attack probability productions and the assessments of the attack return values. The evaluations were completed by running our own developed simulator, which was called MAS-SIM. The simulator was developed by Java on Eclipse Luna Release (4.4.0) and the input data were configured within the similar scope to the features of attacks and frequencies. The hardware configuration was: processor (Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2687W v4 @ 3.00Ghz), 64.0 GB memory.
Moreover, we configure a few experimental settings in order to examine our approach in various application scenarios. The settings were defined by setting different amounts of target frequency spectrums in order to simulate different communication environments. We use MAS-SIM to generate distinct input data. Each set of input data is counted as one evaluation round. Two main experimental settings are described as follows: Setting 1 configured 4 target frequency spectrums and the number of evaluation rounds was 500. Setting 2 configured 6 spectrums with 5000 rounds evaluations. Furthermore, we compared our approach MAS-SJ with a few other algorithms, including Greedy algorithm mixing both jamming and spoofing (G-Mixed), pure jamming, and pure spoofing. Both attack success probability and return values were assessed under each experimental setting.
B. Experimental Results
We represented partial experimental results in this section. Fig. 3 illustrated a comparison between MAS-SJ and other different attack strategies. Based on our experiments, we found that MAS-SJ had a better performance than other attack strategies. Fig. 3 illustrated partial results of comparing the attack return values using MAS-SJ with other attack strategies under Setting 1. Based on the partial comparison results, the average of return values using MAS-SJ was 1.1 times greater than G-Mixed, 1.63 times greater than jamming, and 1.49 times greater than spoofing. MAS-SJ could produce optimal solutions so that the attack return values were higher than other attack strategies.
Next, Fig. 4 depicts the distributions of attack return values for all compared attack strategies. According the collected data, the average of the return value using MAS-SJ was 10.2% bigger than G-Mixed, 54.2% bigger than jamming, and 52.2% bigger than spoofing. We observed that pure jamming and pure spoofing attacks had similar performance in attack return values. Using Greedy algorithm to select jamming and spoofing could increase the return values; however, our MAS-SJ had a better performance than G-Mixed due to the optimal solutions.
In addition, Fig. 5 displayed partial results of comparing attack success probabilities. We found that the average of attack success probabilities using MAS-SJ was 20.9% higher than G-Mixed, 145.7% higher than jamming, and 209.3% higher than spoofing. The results depicted that our approach had an advantage in obtaining higher-level attack success probabilities.
Furthermore, Fig. 6 showed ten groups of collected data for comparing attack return values between MAS-SJ and other attack strategies under Setting 2. According the data, MAS-SJ's average attack return value was 13.0% higher than G-Mixed, 44.5% higher than jamming, and 47.4% higher than spoofing. Under the same setting, Fig. 7 demonstrated the distributions of the attack returns by comparing MAS-SJ with other strategies. The results were obtained from 5000 rounds examinations. We found that the differences between MAS-SJ and other attack strategies became less along with the decrease of the number of frequency spectrums. The average of attack return values using MAS-SJ was 9.3% higher than G-Mixed, 46.8% higher than jamming, and 47.0% higher than spoofing.
Finally, Fig. 8 represented a number of experimental results deriving from the comparisons of attack success probabilities. We found that MAS-SJ's average success probability was 21.4% than G-Mixed, 87.9% higher than jamming, and 455.9% than spoofing. It implied that G-Mixed had a stable performance in gaining success probabilities than purely using jamming or spoofing, even though it had a lower-level performance than our proposed approach MAS-SJ.
In summary, our main findings of experimental evaluations are twofold. First, we have proved that MAS-SJ could always produce optimal solutions, such that both attack return values and attack success probabilities are higher than the compared attack strategies within the power constraint. Second, the difference ratio of the return values would become less when the number of the frequency spectrum grew due to the change of based number. The experimental results provided a proof for demonstrating the implementation of MAS-SJ.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed an attack strategy for CRN in WSGN. The proposed approach, MAS-SJ, optimally distributed power usage on both spoofing and jamming attacks by applying dynamic programming. For supporting the attack strategy, two crucial algorithms were proposed, including MAS and UPR algorithms. Our experimental evaluations had assessed and proved that MAS-SJ performed better than other active approaches.
